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ABSTRACT 
Nationalism is not a naturally occurring sentiment, but rather needs 
to be carefully nurtured and sustained in the social imaginary through 
the production and circulation of unifying narratives that invoke the 
nation’s imagined community. The school curriculum is crucial in this 
process, legitimating and disseminating selected narratives while de-
legitimating and marginalising other accounts and their voices. 
Certain watershed events in nations’ histories have always posed 
political problems in history curricula (Cajani & Ross, 2007) –
however the pressures and concerns of current times now suggest 
political solutions in history curricula. This paper briefly examines 
recent political debates in Australia to argue that the school history 
curriculum has become a site of increasing interest for the exercise of 
official forms of nationalism and the production of a nostalgic, 
celebratory national biography. The public debates around school 
history curriculum are theorised as nostalgic re-nationalising 
efforts in response to the march of cultural globalisation and its 
attendant uncertainties.   
 
 
Introduction 
 
Certain watershed events in nations’ histories have always posed political problems in 
history curricula (Cajani & Ross, 2007). In contrast, this paper is interested in how the 
pressures and concerns of current times have lead governments to seek political solutions 
through the manipulation of school history curricula. While early globalisation theory 
predicted the demise of the nation-state, more recent work has acknowledged the 
contradictory tensions between globalisation’s centripetal and centrifugal forces and the 
reactive counter-effort to re-energise and re-affirm national boundaries and sentiments, 
(Beck, 2004; Robertson, 2001). This paper highlights how the school curriculum, in 
particular the history curriculum in government schools, has become a crucial site for 
2  
 
such re-nationalisation work, moulding the collective identity and the narratives that 
sustain it (see for example Letourneau, Aronoff, & Scott, 2004; Mao, 1997). History 
curricula selections and omissions are making political news in a number of nation-states 
and their alignments (Barton & Levstik, 2004; Cajani, 2007; Simpson & Halse, 2007; 
Taylor, 2007) and it is this broader social phenomena which I seek to understand 
through a worked example of such curriculum politics in Australia. 
 
Beck (2004) argues that ‘processes of renationalization’ (p.150 ) need to be understood 
through the lens of a cosmopolitan methodology which disputes the inherited matrix of 
nations as stable objective facts of life: 
 
In the cosmopolitan turn, it becomes suddenly obvious that it is neither possible 
to clearly distinguish between the national and the international, nor, in a similar 
way, to convincingly contrast homogeneous units. National spaces have become 
denationalised, so that the national is no longer national, just as the international 
is no longer international. The state is not collapsing but changing, and new 
actors, a new global power game and new realities are arising, as are new 
mappings of space and time and new co-ordinates for the social and the political, 
co-ordinates which have to be theoretically and empirically researched and 
elaborated. (Beck, 2004, p.165) 
 
The school history curriculum is one such set of ‘social coordinates’ which attempt to re-
make, re-plot and re-fix national identity in the face of the significant social changes of 
liquid modernity (Bauman, 2000) and the melting of ascribed collective identities. In 
these conditions, how each nation’s history is told and re-presented to its future citizens 
should be understood as a highly symbolic and formative political enterprise which is no 
longer to be left to educators and historians. 
 
The paper will review different types of nationalism and their possible expression in the 
school curriculum and then use aspects of this theory as a lens to understand recent 
interventions in Australian history curricula as a politics of national identity. The 
argument is built in three sections. The first briefly outlines the theoretical approach to 
the concept of curriculum and its inherent politics. The second section reviews a variety 
of sociological literature to derive a typology of nationalisms of different origin and 
character and discusses how they might produce different expressions and effects in the 
school curriculum. The final section reviews the nature of political debates over the 
school history curriculum in Australia in terms of its nostalgic nature. 
 
1. Understanding the politics of curriculum  
 
Though it is common to talk about ‘the’ school curriculum as if it is a singular document 
that is unproblematically knowable, curriculum theory analytically articulates a variety of 
dimensions within any curriculum and the ideological work it performs (Apple, 2004). 
Any school curriculum is thus understood to be complex and multidimensional, 
involving: 
 
• both the selection/legitimation of certain knowledges as stated in syllabus 
documents and de-selection/de-legitimation of what constitutes the null 
curriculum ( in the history curriculum these become what we are to remember as 
a nation, and what is to be forgotten);  
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• both the overt objectives declared and institutionalised in the formal syllabus, and 
the covert or hidden curriculum of other learning that happens through 
unexamined institutional practices;  
• slippage between the idealised planned program and the enacted curriculum  
which is what knowledge actually gets transmitted in the interactions of 
schooling.  
 
These dimensions produce both complexity and richness when it comes to analysing 
what knowledges are ultimately produced or transmitted in school settings. The 
discussion will particularly focus on the formal, declared, overt and legitimated 
knowledges selected and reified in syllabus documents, however this does not discount 
the possibility for such an ‘official’ curriculum to be altered later in its multidimensional 
enactment/consumption.  
 
Bernstein’s theory of the pedagogic device (2000) allows this complexity to be further 
unpacked in terms of the processes and parties involved in curricular control, design and 
enactment – its ‘social grammar’ (2000, p.25). This paper relies on his distinction 
(Bernstein, 2000, p.33) between the ‘official recontextualising field’, being the world of 
politicians, educational bureaucrats and similar who exert the power to scope and delimit 
the syllabus by stipulating certain inputs or outputs, and the ‘pedagogic recontexualising 
field’, being the world of teachers who work to interpret these directives and bring 
knowledge to life in the classroom in ways that are accessible to the students. Bernstein 
points out that there are spaces of freedom as a curriculum moves from one field to 
another. Thus, while this discussion focuses on the work of the official recontextualising 
field, it fully acknowledges that this field of relations will never completely control 
teachers’ work in the classroom.  
 
Any curriculum also needs to be understood as a complex temporal nexus involving the 
past, the present and the future. The past is represented in pedagogic traditions and the 
legacy of high culture canons that powerfully compete for curricular space and legitimacy 
against the urgent more instrumental claims of the future - what students will need to 
participate in the economy/workplace of the future. Debates around these competing 
priorities however are carried out in the social conditions and political contingencies of 
the present tense,  that is, what discourses are dominant now, and what is politically 
strategic and palatable in today’s conditions.  Debates around the school history 
curriculum make these competing priorities clearly evident. For example, Letourneau et 
al. (2004, p.55) simply ask the question, ‘What history for the future of Canada?’ to 
highlight how the teaching of history is not only about the past but equally about 
preparing today’s children for their future citizenship. 
 
Bernstein (2000) offers a typology of different curricular orientations to address how the 
competition between the past/present/future is expressed in curriculum design and 
ultimately in the type of citizen identity the curriculum produces. A ‘retrospective’ 
orientation is intent on reproducing the past in the present, so dignifies traditions and 
prioritizes continuity with strict control over inputs. A ‘prospective’ orientation looks to 
the future and is accountable to emerging skill sets and economic imperatives. It seeks to 
control both the inputs and outputs of educational processes. Bernstein considers these 
two orientations ‘centred’ because they can converge and focus on certain principles for 
the selection of knowledge. In contrast, he considers the ‘market’ orientation ‘de-centred’ 
(p. 205), responding just to the short-term, present tense demands of consumers in order 
to prosper in market contingencies. This market orientation will respond quickly and 
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opportunistically in any direction according to shifts in consumer taste. His fourth 
‘therapeutic’ orientation is used to describe progressive child-centred reforms that focus 
on nurturing the individual. The points he makes regarding the typology are that the 
orientation of the curriculum will shape the teacher and student identities made possible; 
and that a curriculum can be a incoherent combination of such orientations in different 
aspects of its design.  
 
School as an institution has long been recognised as intimately involved in the 
production of the nation. Green and Reid (2002) for example historically analyse the 
English curriculum and the recruitment of teachers as moral, nation-building work. In 
regard to the school history curriculum in particular,  Barton and Levstik (2004) suggest 
that school history curricula invite students to adopt a variety of ‘stances’, by which they 
mean a combination of purposes and practices for engaging with historical knowledge. 
They outline four such stances that are not necessarily mutually exclusive: 
 
First, students are asked to identify: they are asked to embrace connections 
between themselves and the people and events of the past. This is one of the 
most common uses of history, and it is found, for example, when students learn 
about the exploration, settlement, and development of 'our country'. Second, 
students are expected to analyze: they are asked to establish causal linkages in 
history. .. Third, students are expected to respond morally: they are asked to 
remember, admire, and condemn people and events in the past. .. Finally, 
students are expected to display: They are asked to exhibit information about the 
past.  (p.7) 
 
This paper is particularly concerned with the identification stance, and how this potential 
within the history curricula has been recognised by political interest groups who seek to  
shape curricular selection and thus the ‘identity’ outcomes. Within this stance, Barton 
and Lebstik further distinguish identification with family history, identification with 
national history and identification of the present with the past then consider how each of 
these  differently prepare students for citizenship in a pluralist democracy. Identification 
with the nation is in their opinion a necessary condition for a participatory, pluralist 
democracy: ‘when our identity is grounded in the nation's history, we have incentives for 
shared action and public responsibility that would be lacking of we lived only in the 
present’ (p.60). However they acknowledge the attendant risks of promulgating 
ethnocentric, mythic patriotism and ‘national chauvinism’ when the stories legitimated 
are overly celebratory and sanitised.  
 
With this thicker description of curriculum design, dimensions, processes, and political 
tensions, the paper now turns to consider different forms of nationalism and how they 
might be expressed in ‘the’ curriculum. 
 
2. Nationalisms and their curricular expression 
 
Nationalism is a protean concept that has eluded waves of theorisation and debate 
(Lawrence, 2005), and needs to be revisited and reinterpreted as its conditions and 
fortunes change in shifting nation-state configurations:  
 
The relationship between states and nations is everywhere an embattled one. It is 
possible to say that in many societies, the nation and the state have become one 
another's projects. That is, while nations (or more properly groups with ideas 
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about nation-hood) seek to capture or co-opt states and state power, states 
simultaneously seek to capture and monopolise ideas about nationhood. … 
States … are everywhere seeking to monopolize the moral resources of 
community …. states and nation are at each other's throats, and the hyphen that 
links them is now less an icon of conjuncture than an index of disjuncture. 
(Appadurai, 1990)  
 
Following Anderson (1991), the nation will be understood as an ‘an imagined political 
community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’ (Anderson, 1991, 
p.6). Anderson’s work has been criticised for focusing only on cultural production of the 
nation, overlooking other historical, political and linguistic realities that help forge 
national sentiment (Lawrence, 2005). However, our interest here is exactly on such 
cultural and symbolic work undertaken in schools to boost the collective sentiment of 
nationalism, in particular how it is achieved and sustained despite social change, through 
the social technologies of curricular selection and regulation. The following discussion 
draws on a variety of literature to describe four types of nationalism – popular, official, 
banal and paranoid – with examples of how they might be practiced through school 
curriculum.  
 
Anderson distinguishes between bottom up ‘popular nationalism’, and top down, 
strategic  ‘official nationalism’ which invests institutional power in the cultivation of 
such a shared identity: ‘Such official nationalisms were conservative, not to say 
reactionary, policies, adapted from the model of the largely spontaneous popular 
nationalisms that preceded them’ (Anderson, 1991, p.110). Thus popular and official 
forms of nationalism will differ not so much in terms of the symbols and narratives they 
employ but more in their source and the social relations of their mobilisation. Anderson’s 
work around the production of nationalism in colonial nations highlights how the 
government school was a tool with which to enact official nationalism:    
 
the government schools formed a colossal, highly rationalized, tightly centralized 
hierarchy, structurally analogous to the state bureaucracy itself. Uniform 
textbooks, standardized diplomas and teaching certificates, a strictly regulated 
gradation of age-groups, classes and instructional materials, in themselves created 
a self-contained, coherent universe of experience. (Anderson, 1991, p. 121) 
 
This institutional capacity to impose and enforce system-wide coherence helps 
manufacture a ‘unison’ of opinions (Anderson, 1991, p.144). This capacity has been 
exploited in many settings:  
 
There is a strong consensus amongst scholars that the discipline of history served 
an inherently political function in the 19th century projects of nationalism and 
conservatism and the genealogies of the nation-state. In a similar vein, 
postcolonial scholars have argued that history texts have been complicit in the 
rise of imperialism and colonialism ... Yet because history is written within 
particular political formations, the debate has never been about whether history 
was or should be political but about what sort of politics should prevail. 
(Simpson & Halse, 2007, pp.4-5) 
 
The efforts of governments to explicitly control or influence history curricula can be 
understood as the exercise in official nationalism to endorse one certain image of the 
nation’s ‘biography’ (Anderson, 1991,  p.204) over the alternatives circulating in any 
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robust democracy. Where Anderson describes the map as the territorial model of the 
nation imposed on spatial realities, an official history or approved ‘biography’ of the 
nation legitimated through school curriculum similarly serves as the temporal model 
imposed on realities –  it decides what ought to be remembered how, and what ought to 
be forgotten.  
 
Popular nationalism could be expected to be informally expressed in the enacted 
curriculum – with teachers and students drawing on everyday expressions and 
celebrations of the national identity as commonplace happenstance in educational 
settings. The choice of song for assembly items, the book for story time and the current 
affairs item for morning talk will often promote and nurture local and national identities.   
 
In contrast, the exercise of official nationalism would be expressed and pursued through 
the overt, planned school curriculum, for example, through tight government regulation 
of syllabi and textbooks,  or censure of their content. Set textbooks are obvious examples 
of how some knowledge makes the cut and other knowledge is dis-endorsed. The more 
democratic the setting, the more problematic this tactic can become, given the 
multivocality of the community:  
 
If books are distributed to schools as official or adopted history texts, and this 
distribution takes place in democratic societies where there can be open debate 
about interpretations of the past, that is when the trouble really begins, as every 
pressure group and political party in town tries to get in on the act. And the 
arguments rage back and forth, their success being determined, in the short term 
only, by whoever is in control of the government at the time, be it national or 
state.  (Taylor, 2007p.24) 
 
Chen’s work (2005) explores more subtle forms of official nationalism exercised through 
textbook choice. Chen describes waves of deregulation of school textbooks in Taiwan as 
the state moved towards a more democratic state less fixed on mainland China.  These 
reforms in turn produced more complex and subtle politics in its curriculum, and ‘a 
series of hegemonic struggles over school knowledge and textbook production’ (p.60). 
These struggles played out through the decentralization of educational bureaucratic 
processes, and the marketisation of textbook production that still allowed the 
government to steer ‘the production of official knowledge at a distance’ (p.61).  
 
Both popular and official nationalism can contribute to what Billig (1995) describes as 
‘banal nationalism’, which he distinguishes from the more strident and dramatic forms 
of nationalism performed in moments of crisis or war. He defines ‘banal nationalism’ as: 
 
the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be 
reproduced. … these habits are not removed from everyday life. … Daily, the 
nation is indicated, or ‘flagged’, in the lives of its citizenry. Nationalism, far from 
being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic condition. (p.6)  
 
He makes the point that ‘banal’ nationalism is neither ‘benign’ nor innocent, but rather 
powerful, and ‘primed for use in battle’ (p.7) The power of banal nationalism lies in its 
everydayness, for example its habitual symbols and its taken-for-granted ritualistic 
invocation in such mass institutions as the school. Where Billig suggests that the hanging 
flag in the corner symbolises banal nationalism at work, I would similarly highlight the 
symbolic work of the Anzac Day school ceremony, the national anthem at school 
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assembly, the patriotic content of school readers and the ‘commonsense’ history 
reinforced incidentally through the hidden curriculum. The historical narratives thus 
circulated cement and ‘naturalise’ selective accounts in the collective memory. 
 
As an example,  in the wake of the September 11 2001 events, the recent Howard 
government stipulated that government schools had to have a flagpole flying the national 
flag to be eligible for Commonwealth funding (“PM unfurls his patriotic school agenda”, 
Sydney Morning Herald, 23 June 2004, p.5). This could be interpreted as the official 
recontextualising field demanding a more overt display of banal nationalism through the 
hidden curriculum of the school grounds.  
 
In contrast to banal nationalism, Hage (2003) is interested in the affective premises of 
nationalism – how people relate to the nation emotionally. He describes the current state 
of nationalism in Australia, precipitated by global competition and neo-liberal policy 
environments, as ‘paranoid nationalism’, premised on self-interested and defensive 
worry about the nation’s security, rather than on altruistic hope for the nation and a 
willingness to share its ‘surplus of hope’. For Hage, recent political efforts around re-
nationalisation have deflected internal discontent and insecurities by focussing on 
external threats and ‘border disorder’.  
 
It seems to be this kind of paranoid nationalism which has driven recent conservative 
curricular reform and its renationalising efforts in the US as well:  
 
…one other drawback of national identity - the tendency to regard one’s own 
social group as inherently good, moral, and strong, and to believe the worst about 
other groups. After the September 11 attacks, this justification for studying 
history was all the rage among conservative commentators, who renewed their 
efforts to justify history teaching as a way of inspiring patriotism.(Barton & 
Levstik, 2004, p.62) 
 
Apple (2002) similarly documents ‘the urge to have schools participate in a complicated 
set of patriotic discourses and practices that swept over the United States in the wake of 
the disaster’ (p.300), the strong control exercised over what was to be thinkable and 
sayable about the event, and the delicate politics of pedagogical responses in the face of 
political intrusion into school business. By Apple’s narrative account, the ‘mandated 
patriotism’ (2002, p. 306) and the ensuing ‘redefinition of democracy as “patriotic 
fervour”’ (p.307) effectively closed any space for democratic debate.  
 
This section has distinguished different types and styles of nationalism – its officially 
sponsored type as opposed to its popular type ; its banal style and its paranoid style. It  
explored how these forms and styles can interrelate – official nationalism can sponsor 
expressions of banal nationalism, and similary feed paranoid nationalism, as can popular 
nationalism. With this more textured treatment of nationalism and the earlier 
understanding of the inherent politics of curriculum, the discussion now turns to recent 
events in Australia concerning the history curriculum.  
 
3. An Australian example of nostalgia and the retrospectively oriented 
curriculum  
 
Like the conditions in the US described above, parallel efforts were made in Australia to 
promote a more limited, fundamental and paranoid version of nationalist pride. Over its 
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eleven year incumbency, the conservative government of John Howard gradually 
encroached more and more onto the state’s legislative territory of school curricula. It was 
intent on  gatecrashing the official recontextualising field with the aim of turning the 
clock back on progressive reforms that, amongst other developments, had nurtured a 
national identity that embraced and celebrated diversity. For example, on his Australia 
Day address to the National Press Club, 2006, Howard issued a call to arms of “‘a 
coalition of the willing’ to promote changes to the teaching of history, which he said was 
neglected in schools and too often questioned or repudiated the nation’s achievements’ 
(“Howard claims victory in national culture wars’, M. Grattan, The Age, 26 January 2006). 
It is significant that this address followed the racialised violence at Cronulla Beach, 13 
December 2005. He complained of the relativism of history curricula, and argued for a 
re-adjustment of the relative strength of value accorded to the versions of history 
legitimated. He wanted to work symbolically through the school history curriculum to re-
image the nation along nostalgic and celebratory lines, re-asserting  ‘the values, traditions 
and accomplishments of the old Australia’ (Howard quoted in Grattan, 2006, my 
emphasis).  
 
The pursuit of this type of celebratory nationalism would not sit comfortably with the 
processual, historiographic focus of recent history curricular reform. Allowing students 
to undertake research processes to create their own interpretations of historical events 
from primary sources would potentially undermine the ‘unison’ of opinion desired by the 
official nationalism agenda. This conservative political agenda was explicitly linked to the 
aim of shutting down public debate, that ‘divisive, phoney debate about national identity’ 
(Howard quoted in Grattan, 2006), that had made the production of binding collective 
narratives problematic and prompted some collective soul searching on less than glorious 
moments in Australia’s history.  As his proposed alternative, Howard’s address invoked a 
simplistic and populist ‘one people, one destiny’ version of the national identity, 
referencing the image from Federation discourses a century earlier.  
 
These reactive reforms and the character of their cultural referents should be understood 
a both nostalgic and as reactions to the conditions of the 21st century. Robertson (1992) 
identified the production of ‘wilful, politically driven nostalgia’ (p.148) as part and parcel 
of the cultural relativisation of globalisation processes. He argues that as people have to 
grapple with more difference on a day-to-day basis, there is an equal and opposite social 
reaction that seeks to re-capture and re-assert old lost certainties:  
 
Current controversies about the teaching canon are thus significant 
manifestations of globalization, not least because in the contemporary phase of 
globalization the concept of the homogeneous national society is breaking down, 
in spite of the reassertion of nationalism in certain parts of the world. At the 
same time those controversies themselves generate new conceptions of world 
history…. an increasing number of 'entities' in the contemporary world are 
making and remaking their histories in terms of the constraints of the current 
phase of globalization. ‘Modernity’ has undoubtedly enhanced this kind of 
reflexivity, which itself has also helped to produce a certain kind of wilful 
nostalgia.  (pp. 30-31) 
 
Nostalgia is understood as ‘the appetite for images of the past, in the form of what might 
be called simulacra’ (Jameson quoted in Robertson, 1992, p.158).  By Howard reasserting 
the ‘one people, one destiny’ image of the nation, he is seeking to re-build a familiar 
‘home’. It is a ‘simulacrum’ in Baudrilliard’s (1988) sense because it is a model of which 
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the reality no longer exists, if it ever did. Its premise of homogeneity no longer holds. 
The Prime Minister’s discursive intervention aimed to patch up the tattered and faded 
unifying narrative that initially helped achieve collective sentiment for the new nation, 
but is now under attack from growing diversity within. The effort to re-image the history 
curriculum was also an attempt to re-establish the primacy of national identity over other 
competing allegiances. Using Bernstein’s concepts, his vision and purpose was to achieve 
this through a strongly retrospective orientation in the curriculum, to re-construct the 
past in the present by tightly controlling curricular content.  
 
In this frame it is significant but not surprising that the new Labor Minister for 
Education, Julia Gillard, made a statement early in her ministerial appointment that she 
was ‘an educational traditionalist’, backing a ‘traditional interpretation of the nation’s 
history, that is, that Australia was “settled” rather than “invaded” (‘Gillard wants history 
taken back to basics’, The Australian¸ 3 December 2007).  She is aligning with the same 
nostalgic work of re-nationalisation by promoting a retrospective orientation in the 
school history curriculum. Such strategies are not products of the past, but are the 
product of the present and its local/ global political conditions.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper unpacked dimensions of the curriculum and its ‘social grammar’ to allow an 
exploration of how different types of nationalism (official, popular, banal and paranoid) 
could be expressed through school history curricula. Recent efforts of Commonwealth  
governments to intrude and pronounce on curricular matters were understood firstly as 
expressions of a paranoid turn in official nationalism and as effort to re-nationalise the 
social imaginary. The bipartisan promotion of a retrospectively oriented curriculum was 
then interpreted as a nostalgic reaction to the erosion of past certainties produced by 
cultural globalisation.  
 
This paper suggests that history curricular debates warrant close attention as they have 
implications well beyond school settings. The school curriculum has been recognised by 
both sides of Australian politics as a powerful lever with which to steer national 
sentiment through these nervous, volatile times. It allows those that control it to assert 
and endorse powerful ‘truths’ that in turn will shape social realities, thus we can expect a 
growing struggle between state and commonwealth over its control.  Australia is at an 
important watershed moment, about to negotiate a national curriculum, just when the 
curriculum has become an object of such intense political interest. Before putting all our 
eggs in this one basket, we should perhaps pause and examine the risk in creating a 
singular orthodoxy that is exposed to political interests. Will it be the one that produces 
the future we want?   
 
Both political parties have publicly expressed their interest in a more heavy-handed role 
for the official recontextualising field, that is, in more regulation of curricular content to 
satisfy political agendas. As discussed earlier, this will not stop teachers from exploiting 
degrees of freedom and discretion in the pedagogic recontextualising field. My final point 
however, is that a robust democracy should not be satisfied with a curriculum that only 
allows debate around alternative versions of history to happen in between the cracks of 
the official curriculum.  
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